Moritz Schlick was the leader of an influential group of scientists, logicians and philosophers. The content of his book "Problems of Ethics" is the application of the method of logical analysis of language to some of traditional ethical problems. Schlick offers many topics in his book Problems of Ethics -what are the motives of human conduct, what is egoism, what is the meaning of "moral", etc. In this article, focus will be on the explanation of only one of many areas of Schlick's ethics -the meta-theoretical perspective describing the main aims of his ethical magnum opus -Problems of Ethics.
Introduction
Philosophical thought at the University of Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s was a significant part of European philosophical initiatives. An influential ideological platform was formed here, which presented an arguable emphasis on the amendment of the character of philosophy. If philosophy is a science, it belongs to the unique set of contemporary knowledge. Is it a time to 'scientify' this set as a whole, i.e. shape it to the required form in all parts of the extensive mosaic of human knowledge? The anti-metaphysical approach gains the character of proscientific reform of all parts of knowledge. 1 The original strict and universal verificationism rooted in the early Wittgensteinian period has been slowly liberalized. Looking for the meaning of sentences remains dominant, however, the meaning of the sentences themselves should not be strictly conditioned by (often contingent) facts. The problem of modern science is the status of facts which should be the source of any knowledge. Facts within the field of human knowledge are similar, to a lesser extent, to the facts of, for instance, astrophysics.
One of the possible answers was adopted by a group of scientists and philosophers at the University of Vienna, who began to discuss the urgent topic of radical scientism in the 1920s. It was supposed to be realized in the form of paradigmatic transfer of natural-scientific knowledge 111 Dismetaphysics is a direct consequence of scientification. Philosophy and ethics based on science means removing their metaphysical scopes and presumptions. As long as we talk about their language, it should meet the demands of the language of science. According to Schlick, it's about scandalous wasting of time, 5 if we deal with most of the problems which traditionally belong to the field of philosophy and ethics, if we are not looking for new ways of approaches to the search of morality. Schlick is seeking for the support in the renowned David Hume, who was looking for arguments against metaphysics two centuries ago. Vienna scientism began its work in order to set up a mirror to philosophy and ethics. They are and still remain important even in the world of modern thinking -however, it's necessary to show the world of human morality from the perspective and viewpoint of the new scientistic approach.
Philosophy and ethics should keep to their own theories of the fields of reality, which are cognitively taken by science through accepted epistemological and methodological practices, moreover, with an adequate predictive capability enabling the science to be convincing and effective. Said in a different way, the competencies of philosophy and ethics are, in those fields which have been successfully cognitively colonized by science, quite insufficient and their status as an inspirational source is questionable within the contemporary state of knowledge -it's rather the wishful thinking of philosophers and ethicists. If the beginning of the 20 th century is characterized by cognitive overheating in the form of the rapid growth of actual knowledge mainly in the field of natural sciences, philosophy and ethics, in comparison with science, are neither able, nor strive to change their own cognitive status -they refuse scientification in Schlick's spirit. This should be changed along with the introduction of logical positivists on the stage of European knowledge.
Operational scope of ethics
Schlick is one of the founders of logical positivism. If we talk about his understanding of ethics, we find ourselves on uncertain ground if we think of its scientific status. In this understanding, he argues with Bertrand Russell (Russell, 2005, p. 744) , according to whom the elimination of ethical reflection from philosophy's circles of interests is scientifically necessary. He was confident that the essence of the scientific status of ethics must be its value neutrality in the meaning of re-orientation of the search exclusively into a discourse where the sphere of morality appears.
The sphere of morality presents the scope where parameters resist its exact determination. Instincts, reason, emotions, interests, relationships, jurisdiction, religion, art, literature enter the game. Its key player is man and we still know relatively little about him/her. Originally, ethics was a discipline which tried to discover the system of God's commandments, tried to set whether certain actions of men are allowed or not in their light. 6 However, how to understand ethics, if we miss out God, or if we always abstract only from hypothetical metaphysical coherencies? How should ethics look if we strictly request its scientific status? Schlick and his supporters wanted 112 both -ethics with no God as well as no metaphysics. They were confident that new ethics cannot get along without both.
According to Schlick, morality does not represent a field which is available to scientific understanding. 7 However, in spite of this, ethics can behave like a science. It's caused by the fact that it will pay attention to the search for discourse which characterizes the field of moral behaviour. It's related to the character of included facts. They don't look like facts which physics or experimental natural science works with. Weight, time, space, speed in physics do not have the same analogy in ethics 8 -good, justice, freedom, will or intention are totally different facts. For instance, truth as the attributive statement on physical reality is not the same as the truth of human action. "The task of ethics is to explain the moral good. But what sort of thing this good is which we want to explain what the good is?" (Schlick, 1939, pp. 22-23) . How the good can become a part of the facts on which science can reflect?
In spite of a dominant life-long orientation on the theoretical problems of natural sciences, methodology of (mainly) inductive sciences and philosophy, Schlick did not stop dealing with topics which "interested him from his [sic] young age" (Kampitz, 1995, p. 163 ) and belong to the sphere of morality. His interest in ethics and ethical problems was not just superficial, on the contrary. Morality is in every one of us, it presents a significant scope of human behaviour. Humanity or inhumanity is its direct consequence. He was confident that morality is an archetypical 9 part of man as an individual and human society -it forms the character of human action. It always comes "from itself", is intentional and the whole mosaic of its forms is possible within the standpoint of moral criteria. Looking at the history of ethical thinking shows that ethical emotivism (in a particular sense, the opposite of consequentialism) is revitalized by Schlick's effort in 20 th century. David Hume 10 was its supporter -in brief, ethical emotivism "is set to the request of self-realization, as well as to the principle of joy which is not understood purely hedonistically" (Kampitz, 1995, p. 163 ). Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: * Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the "slave of the passions" * Moral distinctions are not derived from reason. * Moral distinctions are derived from moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action.* While some virtues and vices are natural, others, including justice, are artificial. He articulates and defends them within the broader context of his meta-ethics and his ethics of virtue and vice." The one who somehow returned back to Hume's ethical concept was Schlick himself.
At the very beginning of this reflection, it was emphasized that Schlick was aware of the difficulties which came with the transformation of philosophy and ethics to their scientific versions -science was understood only as a part which dominated in the contemporary picture of the world.
11 However, he was confident that in spite of everything, both are possible to scientify themselves on their behalf. The path could be relatively simple, as he thought; however, it requires meta-theoretical reconstruction or (rather) deconstruction when looking at ethics itself. Its role is not to show what we ought to do within the deontological (Kantian) perspective, but to contribute to the understanding of what we do, how and when we act -on the basis of specific semiotic analysis of the terms which belong to the sphere of morality.
Ethics is generally considered as a part of philosophy. However, philosophy, according to Schlick, is not a science, 12 thus is not a system of statements which would infer their sense from their relationship to reality, which makes sense for statements made by physics. " [Its] task consists in making clear the content of scientific propositions that is, in determining or discovering their meaning... this activity constitutes the essence of philosophy; there are no philosophical propositions, but only philosophical acts" (Schlick, 1939, p. xiv) . Our language, speech, words, which we speak to others are older than ethics, philosophy, physics, etc. Language and speech consist of terms which gained their content over the centuries. In their etymology, there are hidden old meanings we want to understand. Ethics, in Schlick's scientific version, deals with them. Why are they interesting for ethics? Ethics, as an important resource enlightening human behaviour, strives for the understanding of what they have meant exactly and what meaning they acquire today! And how does Schlick's study "The Problems of Ethics" really look like through the lens of his own methodological and epistemological norms? Does it just consist of what he requires from philosophical texts? Schlick is well aware of his own limits which he sets, in spite of this; however, he does not resign from the task in hand. In his opinion, it's necessary to introduce two temporary notes which enable him to continuously construct the extensive text of "The Problems of Ethics".
Regarding ethics itself, Schlick states its general characteristics. "Every science is, as such, purely theoretical; it seeks to understand; hence the questions of ethics, too, are purely theoretical problems. As philosophers, we try to find their correct solutions, but their practical application, if such is possible, does not fall within the sphere of ethics, If anyone studies these questions in order to apply the results to life and action, his dealing with ethics has, it is true, a practical end; but ethics itself never has any other goal than the truth" (Schlick, 1939, p. 1) .
Where is the truth, which philosophers and ethicists are looking for, hidden? And how do they find out they are approaching it? If we look into the past of ethical thinking, we cannot overlook 11 According to the representatives of the Vienna Circle, physics gets closest to the ideal of a real science, which has been represented by epochal discoveries in recent decades; Neurath's principle of physicalism expressed a belief that even other sciences, including philosophy and ethics, should resemble physics in the character of their statements, grounds and possibility. 12 It is not a science, but nothing stands in the way of become its queen when science itself becomes the object of interest.
114 that philosopher-ethicists did not manage to avoid the danger of the change from theoretician, philosopher to moralist, researcher to preacher. (Schlick, 1939, p. 3) . In this sense, Schlick follows tradition -said briefly, ethics is interested mainly in the socalled biblical, old-testament good -it is the main object of its interest! 13 If ethics is transcendental, 14 as Ludwig Wittgenstein's 15 early thought had it (and after him even Schlick), how should it look in the light of the requirements of scientification? Moreover, if ethics is transcendental, "ethics cannot be put into words" (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 6.421) . It means that the words we use in discourses on morality are becoming the object of the search of new ethics. From this standpoint, "ethics is the inquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living" (Munitz, 1981, p. 211) . What is the character of the object ethics researches, what can ethics do with it? Schlick's response is brief and clear: "Ethics seeks to understand it, to gain knowledge of it, and would and can under no circumstances do anything else with it. Since ethics is, in essence, [the] theory of knowledge, its task cannot be [sic] produce morality, or to establish it, or call it to life. It does not have the task of producing the good" (Schlick, 1939, p. 3) . Differently said, ethics leaves everything as it is. "Where and how, then, is the good of ethics given? We must from the outset be clear on the point that here there is only one possibility, the same that lies before all other sciences. Wherever an instance of the object to be known occurs, a certain mark (or group of marks) must be exhibited which characterizes the thing or event as one of a certain definite kind, thus distinguishing it from all others in a special way. If this were not so we would have no opportunity and no motive to call it by a special name. Every name which is used in discourse for communication must have a meaning capable of being indicated. Thus it is indeed self-evident, and the object of any other science would not be doubted -only in ethics has it sometimes been forgotten" (Schlick, 1939, p. 4) . This situation needs to be changed so as not to differentiate ethics from other sciences. Schlick made the decision to go this way. The subject of ethics is not the "good", as it inappropriately appears in traditional 13 When writing "Problems of Ethics", Schlick already knew Wittgeinstein's opinions from his Tractate. There we can find a very important reference to ethics. The meaning of what we consider as (im)moral, we have to look for outside of us. Ethics itself tends to lie "behind" the sphere of human action. "Darum kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben... Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt. Die Ethik ist transzendental" (Wittgenstein, 1993, 6.42; 6.421 ). 14 The fact that ethics is transcendental makes it the part of our connection with the mystical, with something we cannot talk-scientifically -about, even though it is ethical in this sense… 15 In November 1930, the year when Schlick's work "Problems of Ethics" was published, Wittgenstein specified his own concept of ethics, which is mentioned just marginally a few times in Tractate, but fills the background, from which Tractate grows. In his work "L. Wittgenstein. Duty of Genius" R. Monk states following Wittgenstein's words: My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk on [E]thics or [R]eligion was to run against the boundaries of language. The running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, cannot be science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is document of a tendency in the human mind" (Monk, 1991, p. 277). philosophical systems -ethics would move within the borders of metaphysics here. Its object is "a good", as it appears in language -ethics is looking for its meanings which are hidden within the layers of language due the long-term use of this word. "But many philosophers see in this a serious difficulty of ethics, indeed the difficulty, and they are of the opinion that the sole task of ethics is the discovery of the definition of good" (Schlick, 1939, p. 5) . George Edward Moore (1873 Moore ( -1958 in his Principia Ethica (1903) drew the way of delimitation of ethics as a discipline which behaves like a science. 16 Right at the beginning of his magnum opus, Moore says: "It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer. I do not know how far this source of error would be done away [with] , if philosophers would try to discover what question they were asking, before they set about to answer [sic] it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult: we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy would disappear" (Moore, 1922, Preface) .
Schlick probably knew the text of Moore's study on ethics, 17 even though he does not mention it those words. Moore, as one of the first, strived for bringing ethics as a theoretical discipline to a trustworthy path of science (as Kant would say) through an intense use of logic and linguistic analysis. There are certain risks hidden in Moore's approach. One of them was that ethics is changing to a quasi-linguistic state here -to a discipline explaining the terms of our language. He characterized the entire former ethics as naturalistic error thereby ethics was not competent to evolve any adequate moral profile of people and their natural discourses. He was interested in meta-ethics, in setting its grounds. Ethics is becoming the interpretation of the content of all moral terms which were formed throughout the centuries. Roughly speaking, even Schlick occurs in this horizon. How should we understand the new ethics? "Rather it would have to be understood as the task of explanation, of complete cognition of the good -which presupposes that the meaning of the concept is already known and then relates it to something else, orders it in more general connections" (Schlick, 1939, p. 6) . However, neither not everything is drawn it no ethics in Schlick's version ought to do.
The inner ambition of ethics in its scientific version is not just a pure description of a good, it's not comfortable with the position of descriptor. Ethics, at least according to Schlick, is 16 Moore insists that "good" is indefinable. He defends the objectivity and multiplicity of values, arguing that knowledge of values cannot be derived from knowledge of facts, but only from intuition of the goodness of such states of affairs as beauty, pleasure, friendship and knowledge. In Moore's view, right acts are those producing the most good. However, he also believed that there are only various different sorts of things that are good, including knowledge and aesthetic experience. Moore's Principia Ethica is one of the most influential books from the beginning of the 20th century. From his analytical standpoint, ethics is a science which can be built without traditional support from metaphysics and theology. Resignation is enough to understand ethics as the formulation of ethical norms and values, which -even according to logical positivists, cannot be the task of ethics, if we are to consider it a science. The main method and even non-crossable border, at the same time, should be an analysis of this type of sentences, which have created the frame of ethical theory. If anything else, Moore's reflections significantly stimulated discussions on meta-ethical questions. 17 It's hard to imagine to have it another way -however, it's not easy to explain why he does not mention it in his work.
creative and discovering. It doesn't reveal, but creates a sense of what we have in our mind in language and speech if we use the word good and its equivalents. "The view according to which the goal of ethics consists of a correct determination of the concept of good could be interpreted as not being concerned with the formulation of the content of the concept, but rather with giving it content... it would mean that the philosopher made, or created, the concept of the good, while without him the word good merely existed. He would of course invent it quite arbitrarily... However, it would be quite absurd to demand of ethics nothing but the arbitrary establishment of the meaning of a word; that would be no achievement at all" (Schlick, 1939, p. 7) . However, the reformulation of the content of the term good is not the ultimate goal of ethics, "it cannot be regarded as anything but a mere preparation... this preparation is not be neglected" (Schlick, 1939, p. 8) . Thus, what is the meaning of ethics, if conceptual (semiotic, logic…) analysis of the good is not ultimate, but only a preparatory phase of its real activity?
Ethics as a normative science Schlick's study Fragen der Ethik [Questioning Ethics] was published at the time of logical positivism. The author asks, besides everything else, for the status of ethics -he is interested whether ethics is a normative science or science about reality/matter. What is the reality of ethics as a science? Even these two types of sciences -normative sciences and sciences about reality, have to meet the criteria which even other sciences meet all together and every one of them individually. And -in this sense, it's not possible to oppose them to themselves. Logical positivists preferred opinion that ethics is or ought to be built as a normative science. It doesn't say, what the reality of human behaviour and its motivation is, it's not its description (for instance, that's the role of psychology or sociology, politics).
In the researched context, we are interested in Schlick's arguments in favour of opinion that "ethics is a normative science" (Schlick, 1939, p. 17) . This idea is not a new one, but on the contrary, its acceptance is connected to Kantian heritage. 18 What does it really mean that ethics is a) a science and b) a normative science? The status of science is based on the fact that the materials which a scientist works with are the facts -in our case, facts of human nature. Ethics furnishes a justification for these facts in a relative-hypothetical way, not absolutely. "It is never able to do more than to discover the rules of the judgment, to read them from the facts before; the origin of norms always lies outside and before science and knowledge" (Schlick, 1939, p. 18) . Ethics cannot and is not able to do more than its own resources enable it to. Ethics doesn't say what the good is, ethics tells us what good actually means; it can never tell us what good must or should mean. If we talk about ethics as a normative science, Schlick's position is "we see that this theory of norms affords nothing more than the discovery of the meaning of the concept of good. There is no question in it of a real explanation of good; it offers ethics only the object which is to be explained" (Schlick, 1939, p. 23) .
The explanation is reduction to something more general, the moral good could be shown to be a special case of a more general kind of good. Ethics seeks causal explanation. The word good is an abstraction, but is "connected with actual mental occurrences and separate acts of this sort are quite capable of explanation, that is, can be reduced to one another" (Schlick, 1939, p. 24) . By logical-linguistic analysis of the term 'equipment of human morality', normative ethics strives to transform particular terms using the reductive method to the level of having their factual status clear which is characteristic for a scientific approach. The normativity of ethics does not change "the state of a matter", it changes the way of their language/linguistic symbolic image which is available to our understanding.
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Ethics as factual science The facts which ethics operates with, creates norms, values, motives of human behaviour -they are derived from the human character and the life of people. "No result of ethics can stand in contradiction to life; ethics cannot declare as evil or false those values which lie at the foundation of life; its norms cannot demand or command anything that is in real opposition to those final norms recognized by life. Where such opposition occurs, it is a sure sign that the philosopher has misunderstood his problem, and has failed to solve it; that he has unwittingly become a moralist, that he feels uncomfortable in the role of knower and would prefer to be a creator of moral values" (Schlick, 1939, p. 20) . In such a case, the philosopher or ethicist does not behave like a scientist -a scientist is even neither a moralist, nor a visionary, a scientist can see just what he/she is able to express in language which is understandable even to others. This platform, which the ethicist is based on, is the real life of people, the motives of their behaviour, disagreement with the idealization of human character. "There could be no real opposition between the meaning of the word good that is actually accepted in life, and the meaning found by philosophers" (Schlick, 1939, p. 20) . The language we use and the reason through which we reflect on moral facts of human life, are not perfect as tools -if we are able to understand their imperfections and limitations, we can reduce or limit the number of errors.
"The ultimate valuations are facts existing in human consciousness, and even if ethics were a normative science it would not cease, because of this, to be a science of facts. Ethics has to do entirely with the actual; this seems to me to be the most important of the propositions which determine its task" (Schlick, 1939, p. 20) . The facts of ethics are ultimate valuations -the ethicist considers them as facts, they are the scope of his reflections. However, ethics is a normative science -as such, it sets hierarchical order of rules, "[in] which all acts and attitudes and characters would possess a definite place with respect to their moral value" (Schlick, 1939, p. 22) . Ethics becomes the theory of norms, rules which it actually finds in motives of human behaviour, it doesn't judge people, it explains the character of their actions. Ethics cannot fill this role by itself -but it accepts that truth. "If we decide that the fundamental question of ethics, "Why does man act morally?" can be answered only by psychology, we see in this no degradation of, nor injury to, science, but a happy simplification of the word-picture. In ethics we do not seek independence, but only the truth" (Schlick, 1939, p. 30) .
Conclusion
According to Rudolf Carnap, a close co-worker of Schlick's, this founder did not experience the appreciation that he would deserve (Collinson, 1987, p. 276) . It was maybe caused by his early tragic death, maybe the fact that logical positivism was a collective work and Schlick was only one of its creators. However, in spite of this, Schlick's "footprint" in philosophy is consistently visible and it's likewise true even in his ethics and the "problems" he tries to reflect in a nonstandard way. 
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